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Abstract
Background: From a management perspective, it is necessary to examine how a hospital’s top management
assess the patient safety culture in their organisation. This study examines whether the Hospital Survey on Patient
Safety Culture for hospital management (HSOPS_M) has the same psychometric properties as the HSOPS for
hospital employees does.
Methods: In 2008, a questionnaire survey including the HSOPS_M was conducted with 1,224 medical directors
from German hospitals. When assessing the psychometric properties, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA). Additionally, we proved construct validity and internal consistency.
Results: A total of 551 medical directors returned the questionnaire. The results of the CFA suggested a
satisfactory global data fit. The indices of local fit indicated a good, but not satisfactory convergent validity.
Analyses of construct validity indicated that not all safety culture dimensions were readily distinguishable. However,
Cronbach’s alpha indicated that the dimensions had an acceptable level of reliability.
Conclusion: The analyses of the psychometric properties of the HSOPS_M resulted in reasonably good levels of
property values. Although the set of dimensions within the HSOPS_M needs further scale refinement, the
questionnaire covers a broad range of sub-dimensions and supplies important information on safety culture. The
HSOPS_M, therefore, is eligible to measure safety culture from the hospital management’s points of view and
could be used in nationwide hospital surveys to make inter-organisational comparisons.
Background
Safety culture is an aspect of organisational culture that
relies on safety issues in organisations. Guldenmund
characterised organisational culture as a relatively stable,
multidimensional construct that depends on shared
values and norms in the work environment [1]. These
values and norms affect the attitudes, perceptions and
behaviour of all organisational members. Safety culture,
as a part of organisational culture, therefore, has a funda-
mental impact on safety behaviour and, in turn, on safety
in organisations as a whole. It is a multidimensional phe-
nomenon that is defined here as a common stock in
knowledge, values and symbols about patients’ safety.
Organisations with a positive safety culture are charac-
terised by open communications based on a common
foundation of values and trust, as well as shared percep-
tions and mutual support among individual organisa-
tional members [2,3].
Measuring safety culture in health care received
increased attention at the end of the 1990s. This was con-
tributed to by the publication of the report To err is
human by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) [4]. Early mea-
sures of safety culture in health care were adapted from
those used in industrial sectors in the late 1990s [5]. Since
then, a large number of surveys have been published
regarding safety culture in health care settings [6-8].
Nonetheless, safety culture is still a major issue in health
care research. This is reinforced by the increasing external
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high quality health care. Prior research has concluded that
the attitudes, perceptions, expectations and actions of hos-
pitals’ top management regarding patient safety is an
essential dimension of safety culture [5,7-12]. Organisa-
tional improvement towards safety culture is largely based
on the commitment of the hospital management, whose
members, such as medical directors, are essential decision
makers. The hospital management is responsible for the
establishment of policies and procedures on quality
improvement and hospital safety culture [13]. From the
management perspective, it is necessary to examine how
they assess safety culture in their own organisations. This
point of view on hospital safety culture is important for
their decisions. In addition, Rousseau [14] stated that the
use of key informants is common practice in research into
organisational culture. Key informants, such as members
of the hospital management, are presumed to have a com-
prehensive knowledge about their organisations. However,
most safety culture surveys measure safety culture from
the frontline staff’sp o i n t so fv i e w .
Although the commitment and perceptions of hospital
managers are expected to be important for patient safety,
there exists no tool for measuring safety culture from the
hospital management’s points of view. Therefore, the well-
known Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture
(HSOPS) [15] was adapted to assess the safety culture per-
ceptions of hospital managers, such as medical directors,
in German hospitals (HSOPS_M). Thus, the purpose of
this study was to test (1) whether the HSOPS_M could be
used in a management survey and (2) if the psychometric
properties of the HSOPS_M are comparable to those of
the HSOPS for hospital employees.
Methods
Study design and population
The following analyses are based on data of the project
Effects of Hospital Ownership Structures on Quality of
Health Care (HOSQua) funded by the German Medical
Association. This study has been approved by the
Research Ethics Board at the University of Cologne.
Data were gathered between April and October 2008
within a cross-sectional, retrospective postal survey. The
questionnaires were distributed to 1,224 medical direc-
tors from all German hospitals that fulfilled the following
criteria: at least one internal medicine and one surgery
unit. In order to increase the response rate we examined
the classic total design method by using timed reminder
and follow-up mailings (including the questionnaire
again) [16,17].
Measure
The HSOPS has been used worldwide in more than 30
countries. As far as is known, this survey for hospital
employees has been translated and adapted for use in 14
European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Scotland, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom).
To measure safety culture from the hospital manage-
ment’s points of view in German hospitals, we adapted
the Swiss-German version [18] of the HSOPS to assess
medical directors’ views of German hospitals. The final
version for the hospital management, especially the medi-
cal directors (HSOPS_M), slightly differs from the origi-
nal HSOPS (e.g. we excluded the individual item
outcome measure Number of events reported;t h em a n -
agement version only uses the term staff instead of
people). It consisted of 43 items: 10 safety culture dimen-
sions and two outcome dimensions, as well as the indivi-
dual item outcome measure Patient safety grade.T h e
questionnaire scale items are listed in Table 1. Most
items of these dimensions are rated on a five-point Likert
scale ranging from Is t r o n g l yd i s a g r e e(1) to Is t r o n g l y
agree (5). Some items are rated on a five-point frequency
scale from Never (1) to Always (5). The HSOPS_M ques-
tionnaire can be downloaded as additional file 1: Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety Culture for hospital manage-
ment (HSOPS_M). A German version of HSOPS_M is
available on request.
Data analyses
Before starting the in-depth analysis, respondents with
missing values of > 30% in scale items were excluded
because of the limited data quality. Afterwards, missing
values were replaced by a multiple imputation based on
expectation maximization (EM) algorithm with the sta-
tistical software NORM 2.03 [19]. Further analyses were
started after a necessary reverse coding of negatively
worded items.
Within the pre-analyses, we calculated the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Measure of Sample Adequacy
(MSA) coefficients. The value of the KMO coefficient indi-
cates whether the sample of items is adequate for a factor
analysis or not, whereas the MSA coefficient proves
whether a single item is suitable for a factor analysis or
not. For both, KMO coefficient and MSA coefficient
values of > .60 imply a good applicability and values of
> .90 imply a perfect applicability [20]. Finally, we per-
formed Bartlett’s test. A high significant p-value (p < .001)
indicates an appropriate dataset for factor analysis.
Using the maximum likelihood method, we performed
a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) [21] to check
whether the theoretical and empirical developed factor
structure of the original version for hospital employees
fits to the data of the German version for the hospital
management. The appropriateness of the CFA model
was assessed by measures of global and local fits [21,22].
To evaluate the global fit of the 12-factor model we
Hammer et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:165
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/165
Page 2 of 10Table 1 Questionnaire scale items
Dimension Item
Safety Culture Dimensions
Hospital management support F1 Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety.
for patient safety F8 The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority.
F9r Hospital management seem to be interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens.
Supervisor/manager
expectations/actions
B1 Supervisors/managers say a good word when they see that a job has been done according to established
procedures (standards and guidelines).*
B2 Supervisors/managers seriously consider staff suggestions for improving patient safety.
B3r Whenever pressure builds up, supervisors/managers want staff to work faster, even if it means taking
shortcuts or skipping steps.
B4r Supervisors/managers overlook patient safety problems that happen over and over.
Teamwork across hospital F2r Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other.
units F4 There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together.
F6r It is often unpleasant for staff from one hospital unit to work with staff from other hospital units.
F10 Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients.
Teamwork within units A1 Staff support one another within the units.
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, staff within the units work together as a team to get the
work done.
A4 Staff within the units treat each other with respect.
A11 When one area within a unit gets really busy, others help out.
Communication openness C2 Staff within units will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care.
C4 Staff within units feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority.
C6r Staff within units are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right.
Hospital handoffs and F3r Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring patients from one unit to another.
transitions F5r Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes within the hospital units.
F7r Problems often occur during the exchange of information across hospital units.
F11r Shift changes are problematic for patients within the hospital units.
Nonpunitive response to error A8r Staff within the individual units feel like their mistakes are held against them.
A12r When an event (e.g., mistake) is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem.*
A16r Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file.
Feedback and communication
about errors
C1 Staff within units are given feedback about changes put into place based on events reported (e.g.,
mistakes).*
C3 Staff within units are informed about events (e.g., errors) that happen in their units.*
C5 Staff within units discuss ways to prevent an event (e.g., error) from happening again.*
Staffing A2 Units within this hospital have enough staff to handle the workload.
A5r Unit staff work longer hours than is best for patient care.
A7r The units use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care.
A14r Staff within units work in “crisis mode” trying to do too much, too quickly.
Organizational learning A6 Staff within the units are actively doing things to improve patient safety.
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes within the hospital units.
A13 After changes have been made to improve patient safety within the units, their effectiveness is evaluated by
the staff.
Outcome Dimensions
Overall perceptions of safety A10r It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen within the units.
A15 Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done.
A17r We have patient safety problems within the units.
A18 Unit procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening.
Frequency of event reporting D1r When an event (e.g., error) occurs that is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is
this reported?*
D2r When an event (e.g., error) occurs that poses no potential harm to the patient, how often is this reported?*
D3r When an event (e.g., error) occurs that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported?*
NOTE: Items marked with * include very special adoptions for a survey in Germany. For these items, additional translations closer to the original HSOPS version
are available.
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which indicate the difference between the observed and
the expected covariance matrices [21,22]. To reduce the
sensitivity of the Chi-squared value to the sample size
we computed a normed Chi-squared value (Chi
2/df)
using the recommended cut-off value of ≤ 2.5 [23]. In
addition, the following incremental and descriptive mea-
sures of model fit were calculated: (1) Comparative Fit
Index (CFI); (2) Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI); (3) Root
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA); and (4)
Standardised Root Mean Residual (SRMR). Using
recommended criteria for a sample size N > 250 and a
number of observed variables m > 30, we determined
the cut-off values of ≥ .90 for CFI and TLI, ≤ .07 for
RMSEA and ≤ .08 for SRMR [22]. Furthermore, the
local fit of the items of the proposed factor structure
were estimated with the following criteria and cut-off
values: indicator reliability (≥ .30), factor reliability
(≥ .60) and Average Variance Extracted (AVE; ≥ .50)
[24]. These local fit indicators assess the degree to
which the instrument is reliable and valid.
In a second step, the construct validity was tested by
calculating the Fornell-Larcker Ratio (FLR) [25-27].
According to Fornell and Larcker [26], discriminant
validity is given when the AVE of a factor is greater than
the highest squared inter-correlation with any other fac-
tor of the model. Values of < 1 indicate that constructs
within the model are sufficiently distinguishable. Further-
more, we calculated Pearson’s correlation coefficients for
all 12 safety culture dimensions after calculating a com-
posite score for each dimension. According to Campbell
and Fiske [28], we determined a cut-off value of ≥ .70.
Higher values indicate that the dimensions measure the
same concepts. Pearson’s correlation values of < .20
would indicate a poor relationship between two safety
culture dimensions [29]. Despite all 12 dimensions mea-
sure safety culture, we assumed that sufficient inter-cor-
relations would be reflected by moderate Pearson’s
correlation coefficient values. Additionally, we calculated
correlations between the 12 safety culture dimensions
and the individual item outcome measure Patient safety
grade. We expected significant positive correlations.
Finally, the internal consistency was measured by
using Cronbach’s alpha for each of the 12 dimensions.
Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of how strongly items are
correlated [30]. A value of zero indicates no correlation
between the items, whereas a value of one indicates a
perfect correlation. If items are related too closely, the
information of the items is redundant. Therefore, a
good value of Cronbach’s alpha is between .70 and .90
[20,21,30]. The reliability of the scales were compared to
the results of the original HSOPS by Sorra and Nieva,
who defined the acceptable level of Cronbach’sa l p h aa s
≥ .60 [15].
All statistical analyses were performed using the statis-
tic software SPSS 18.0 and AMOS 18.0.
Results
Sample characteristics
The overall response rate was 45% (551 out of 1,224
questionnaires). Of those, four respondents were
excluded because of limited data quality (missing values
of > 30% in scale items). Finally, 547 questionnaires were
included in the analysis. For these, we observed a mean
average of 0.32% missing values in the items of the scales.
The missing values were imputed applying the EM algo-
rithm [19]. Descriptive statistics, including means and
standard deviations for all items within the scales, are
presented in Table 2.
The value of the KMO coefficient was .947. This indi-
cated that the patterns of correlations are very compact
and a factor analysis is appropriate for our data [20]. The
values of the MSA coefficients ranged between .87 (A5)
and .98 (C5). Except for two items (A5 and D2), all items
reached a superior value of > .90. Therefore, both the
KMO test and the MSA test indicated that the data fit
t h ec r i t e r i af o raf a c t o ra n a l y s i s[ 2 0 ] .F i n a l l y ,t h ep-value
of < .001 within Bartlett’s test indicated an appropriate
data structure for applying factor analysis.
Confirmatory factor analysis
The results of the CFA model indicated a satisfactory
global data fit: Chi
2 = 1,632.71; df = 753; p < .000; Chi
2/
df = 2.168. According to the criterion by Hair et al. [22],
of the more than 30 observed items and the minimum of
250 observations the model exhibited an acceptable-to-
good global data fit (Table 3).
Furthermore, two out of three indices of local fit, as
presented in Table 4 indicated a good convergent valid-
ity: except for the dimension Supervisor/manager expec-
tations/actions, no scale included more than one item
with an indicator reliability ≤ .30. Additionally, the factor
reliabilities exceeded the recommended critical values of
≥ .60. However, according the AVE, only the four factors
Hospital management support for patient safety, Hospital
handoffs and transitions, Feedback and communication
about error and Frequency of event reporting reached
acceptable values of ≥ .50.
Construct validity
Concerning the FLR (Table 4), only three dimensions
(Hospital management support for patient safety, Staffing
and Frequency of event reporting)s h o w e da c c e p t a b l e
values. All of the other values indicated that these dimen-
sions were not sufficiently distinguishable from the other
dimensions within the model. The inter-correlations for
the 12 safety culture dimensions are shown in Table 5.
The correlations ranged from .13 (between Staffing and
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Dimension Item Mean
per item
Standard
deviation
per item
Overall
mean
per scale
Overall
standard
deviation
per scale
Safety Culture Dimensions
Hospital management support for patient safety F1 3.69 .766 3.73 0.81
F8 3.61 .985
F9 3.90 .968
Supervisor/manager expectations/actions B1 3.48 .706 3.68 0.52
B2 3.91 .616
B3 3.44 .824
B4 3.91 .721
Teamwork across hospital units F2 3.57 .832 3.80 0.59
F4 3.84 .689
F6 3.89 .782
F10 3.88 .710
Teamwork within units A1 3.80 .663 3.56 0.56
A3 3.57 .770
A4 3.58 .690
A11 3.30 .799
Communication openness C2 3.82 .672 3.68 0.55
C4 3.26 .720
C6 3.95 .775
Hospital handoffs and transitions F3 3.49 .813 3.56 0.68
F5 3.44 .878
F7 3.66 .761
F11 3.64 .875
Nonpunitive response to error A8 3.71 .809 3.87 0.69
A12 3.96 .869
A16 3.93 .902
Feedback and communication about error C1 3.80 .820 3.80 0.66
C3 3.81 .802
C5 3.78 .739
Staffing A2 2.70 .901 3.19 0.71
A5 3.19 1.058
A7 3.96 .891
A14 2.90 .930
Organizational learning A6 3.83 .587 3.64 0.53
A9 3.61 .749
A13 3.49 .773
Outcome Dimensions
Overall perceptions of safety A10 3.93 .897 3.62 0.63
A15 3.22 .969
A17 3.87 .782
A18 3.44 .737
Frequency of event reporting D1 3.38 .934 3.33 0.78
D2 3.07 .896
D3 3.54 .825
Hammer et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:165
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/11/165
Page 5 of 10Frequency of event reporting)t o. 6 4( b e t w e e nHospital
management support and Overall perception of safety).
Except for the correlation between Staffing and Fre-
quency of event reporting, all correlations reached accep-
table values between .20 and .70. Nonetheless, several
intercorrelations reached values higher .5. This indicated
that there was not at all a moderate relationship between
the safety culture dimensions, and supported the result,
that not all safety culture dimensions were sufficiently
distinguishable. Furthermore, we calculated correlations
between the 12 safety culture dimensions and the indivi-
dual outcome measure Patient safety grade. The lowest
correlation of this outcome measure was with Staffing
(r = 0.32), and the highest correlation was with Overall
perceptions of safety (r = 0.62).
Reliability
The reliability measured by Cronbach’s alpha ranged from
.61 to .87 (Table 6), whereas the levels of Cronbach’s
alphas for Supervisor/manager expectations/actions, Com-
munication openness and Organizational learning were
below an adequate value of .70. The other dimensions
reached acceptable reliability coefficients. Compared with
the results found from the US data, Staffing had a much
higher alpha in the German data. However, the scales
Communication openness and Organizational learning had
much lower alphas in the German data.
Discussion
The HSOPS is one of the most frequently used question-
naires to assess safety culture in health care settings.
Until now, this questionnaire has been used to evaluate
safety culture from employees’ points of view. There exist
an increasing number of studies testing how consistently
the HSOPS questionnaire measures safety culture dimen-
sions [18,29,31-33]. However, these surveys have all been
tested with medical staff only. Because it is important to
test whether the HSOPS is also applicable for assessing
single views of a hospital’s safety culture, the purpose of
our study was to test the psychometric properties of the
HSOPS adapted for hospital management (HSOPS_M).
The CFA indicated that the factor structure of the
original HSOPS fits the data of the German version for
medical directors. The factor model exhibited an accep-
table-to-good global data fit. Furthermore, the local fit
indices were considered acceptable. Regarding the indi-
cator reliability, most indicators, except one, exceeded
the acceptable values. All factors reached the recom-
mended critical values for the factor reliabilities, but
only four factors reached adequate AVE values. These
results suggested a good convergent validity. The results
of the local fit indicators, especially for the AVE, found
in this study are comparable to the results of the Swiss-
German version of the HSOPS [18].
According the construct validity, only three dimensions
reached satisfactory values for the FLR. Therefore, the
construct validity of the factor model can be considered
less acceptable. The values of FLR indicated that the fac-
tors measured not readily distinguishable dimensions.
The values of the FLR are similar to the Swiss data analy-
sis [18]. Furthermore, the inter-correlations between all
12 safety culture dimensions ranged between .13 and .64.
We found several correlations higher than .5, which sup-
ported the result that the dimensions were not at all
independent of each other. One possible reason for the
high values of FLR and high intercorrelations could be
that theoretically correlated dimensions (e.g. Feedback
and communication about error and Communication
openness; Hospital management support for patient safety
and Supervisor/manager expectations/actions)a r em e a -
sured with different constructs. This suggested further
investigation, especially on the question whether these
dimensions should be measured in one dimension. None-
theless, as expected, all 12 safety culture dimensions cor-
related with the outcome variable Patient safety grade.
We found a high correlation between Patient safety
grade and Overall perceptions of safety,w h i c hi sag o o d
indication of the validity of the latter dimension.
Finally, the analysis of Cronbach’s alpha signified that
the dimensions have an acceptable level of reliability. In
nine out of the 12 dimensions hypothesised in the origin
factor model, the Cronbach’s alpha ranged between .73
and .87. In addition, the alpha of the factor Supervisor/
manager expectations/actions was not much below the
recommended cut-off value of .70. In particular, for Com-
munication openness and Organizational learning,t h e
lower values of Cronbach’s alpha can probably be attribu-
ted to the different survey designs (e.g. measuring manage-
ment perception versus the perceptions of frontline staff).
Nevertheless, a comparison of these reliabilities with other
European HSOPS surveys showed that Communication
openness [18,32] and Organizational learning [18,31,32]
repeatedly had low Cronbach’s alpha values.
Overall, the construct validity indicated that further
scale refinement is needed to improve the questionnaire.
Table 3 Model fits of the 12 HSOPS_M dimensions
Model Fit Index Criterion
(N > 250 and m ≥ 30)
Fit index
German sample
Chi
2 1632.708
df 753
p < .05 .000
Chi
2/df < 2.5 2.168
CFI > 0.90 .916
TLI > 0.90 .904
RMSEA ≤ 0.07 .046
SRMR < 0.08 .048
NOTE: For thresholds of acceptable fit see Hair et al. [22] and Bollen [23]
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refrained from reducing or adding any scales within the
instrument. Nonetheless, model modifications should
not generally be excluded. Especially in cases of high
intercorrelations between dimensions, which are
theoretically high correlated, further scale refinement
could lead to better psychometric properties. In this
respect, we agree with Pfeiffer and Manser [18] that the
set of dimensions within the HSOPS still has to be
optimised.
Table 4 Local fit of items within the 12 HSOPS_M dimensions
Dimension Item Indicator
reliability
Factor
reliability
AVE FLR
Safety Culture Dimensions
Hospital management support for patient safety F1 .663 .87 .70 .91
F8 .704
F9 .710
Supervisor/manager expectations/actions B1 .270 .71 .39 1.72
B2 .463
B3 .261
B4 .590
Teamwork across hospital units F2 .413 .79 .48 1.34
F4 .567
F6 .350
F10 .654
Teamwork within units A1 .465 .78 .47 1.25
A3 .552
A4 .606
A11 .305
Communication openness C2 .519 .65 .38 2.00
C4 .260
C6 .376
Hospital handoffs and transitions F3 .685 .82 .54 1.21
F5 .444
F7 .664
F11 .405
Nonpunitive response to error A8 .410 .73 .48 1.42
A12 .636
A16 .383
Feedback and communication about error C1 .564 .79 .56 1.37
C3 .564
C5 .556
Staffing A2 .504 .75 .43 .93
A5 .398
A7 .193
A14 .631
Organizational learning A6 .361 .62 .36 1.94
A9 .341
A13 .365
Outcome Dimensions
Overall perceptions of safety A10 .452 .73 .40 1.72
A15 .299
A17 .431
A18 .475
Frequency of event reporting D1 .746 .87 .69 0.55
D2 .707
D3 .593
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aspects. The results of this study are based on a cross-
sectional mail survey with a response rate of 45%.
Although little is known about potential non-response
bias with these kinds of surveys, we assumed that the
attitudes of the responding medical directors do not dif-
fer from those of non-responding medical directors [34].
Within the scope of this study, we were not able to
examine the relationship between patient safety culture
and objective patient safety outcomes, such as patient
safety indicators or frequencies of medical errors. There-
fore, we agree with previous suggestions [7,29] that more
evidence is needed on the relationship between patient
safety culture and patient safety outcomes.
Comparing the psychometric properties of the
HSOPS_M to those of the original HSOPS for hospital
employees means not only comparing different countries,
but also different methods. Most safety culture surveys
are used to measure safety culture from the frontline
staff’s points of view. Assessing safety culture only with
medical directors excludes the views of frontline staff and
does not take the potential differences between hospital
u n i t s[ 3 5 - 3 8 ]i n t oa c c o u n t .T h e r e f o r e ,w et h i n kt h ea r e a
of application of the HSOPS_M is different from tradi-
tional hospital-related safety culture instruments.
According to Rousseau [14], we presupposed that the
points of view of key informants, such as medical direc-
tors, were representative of hospital professionals in iden-
tifying safety culture for the whole hospital. Hospital
managers are expected to make decisions regarding qual-
ity improvement and patient safety issues. In addition,
essential decision makers - such as medical directors -
have a comprehensive knowledge about their organisa-
tions. Therefore, questioning the top management offers
Table 5 Inter-correlations of the 12 HSOPS_M dimensions
Factor PSG 123456789 1 0 1 1
1 Hospital management support for patient safety .50
2 Supervisor/manager expectations/actions .48 .60
3 Teamwork across hospital units .49 .58 .55
4 Teamwork within units .45 .47 .49 .59
5 Communication openness .37 .47 .52 .46 .44
6 Hospital handoffs and transitions .49 .53 .48 .62 .46 .40
7 Nonpunitive response to error .43 .50 .54 .53 .46 .48 .49
8 Feedback and communication about error .38 .60 .54 .48 .47 .62 .43 .47
9 Staffing .32 .44 .38 .32 .34 .22 .42 .38 .27
10 Organizational learning .44 .59 .53 .49 .55 .50 .41 .43 .59 .22
11 Overall perceptions of safety .62 .64 .60 .54 .48 .46 .57 .60 .53 .48 .56
12 Frequency of event reporting .33 .42 .39 .32 .30 .47 .33 .32 .49 .13 .45 .41
NOTE: PSG = Patient Safety Grade. All correlations are significant at p ≤ 0.001.
Table 6 Reliability of the 12 safety culture dimensions in the German data compared with the US data
Dimension No. of items Cronbach’s
alpha
American data
for staff
a
Cronbach’s alpha
German data for
management
Safety Culture Dimensions
Hospital management support for patient safety 3 .83 .87
Supervisor/manager expectations/actions 4 .75 .69
Teamwork across hospital units 4 .80 .78
Teamwork within units 4 .83 .77
Communication openness 3 .72 .64
Hospital handoffs and transitions 4 .80 .83
Nonpunitive response to error 4 .79 .73
Feedback and communication about error 3 .78 .79
Staffing 4 .63 .73
Organizational learning 3 .76 .61
Outcome Dimensions
Overall perceptions of safety 4 .74 .73
Frequency of event reporting 3 .84 .86
NOTE:
a Results of the pilot study [15]
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viding aggregated organisational data. For analysing the
safety culture in different hospitals units, further research
should consider using the HSOPS_M for hospital unit
managers as well.
Finally, the HSOPS_M was embedded in a larger ques-
tionnaire within the HOSQua-study, which could be a
possible factor that influenced the responses of the medi-
cal directors. According to Linsky [39], we assumed that
the length of the questionnaire would not necessarily
influence the validity or reliability of the HSOPS. None-
theless, further analyses on validity and reliability should
be performed using the HSOPS_M questionnaire only.
Conclusion
The HSOPS questionnaire covers a wide range of sub-
dimensions. In addition to the most frequently included
concepts, such as management commitment, supervisor
commitment, communication openness, and safety system,
the HSOPS uses dimensions such as feedback and com-
munication about errors/events, organizational learning,
handoffs and transitions, staffing and teamwork. As such,
the HSOPS provides a broad range of important informa-
tion on safety culture, although, the results of the psycho-
metric properties of the HSOPS_M suggest that further
scale refinement and model modifications are needed.
While the lack of confirmation of factor structure was
found in other European studies using the HSOPS for hos-
pital employees, it should be noted that several dimensions
emerged relatively consistently across national settings.
Therefore, we suggest investigating the HSOPS_M in dif-
ferent national and international settings, to optimise the
set of safety culture dimensions. The HSOPS_M could
then be used in nationwide hospital surveys to assess the
top management’s views on safety culture in hospitals for
subsequent inter-organisational comparisons. For exam-
ple, the HSOPS_M could be used as a measurement to
prove interventions on safety performance in hospitals
from the top management’sp o i n t so fv i e w .N o n e t h e l e s s ,
further research regarding the relationship between safety
culture and other variables (e.g., mortality rates and
patient safety indicators) is needed.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Hammer_BMC_HSOPS_M_Questionnaire. Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety Culture for hospital management (HSOPS_M).
HSOPS_M (English version)
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